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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
E. KEITH LIGNELL, MARIAN H.
LIGNELL,. his wife, BURTON M.
TODD and PHYLLIS h'. TODD,
his wife,
Plaintiffs and
Appellants,

*
*
*

v.

*

CLIFFORD M. BERG and WILLIAM
R. BERG, a partnership, dba
BERG BROTHERS CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, and FIDELITY AND
DEPOSIT COMPANY OF MARYLAND,
a corporation,

*

Defendants and
Respondents.

1-t r;? .'

*

ly'fg

Case No. 15001

*
*
*
*

ADDITIONAL PAGES 13-18

Plaintiffs are aware of no provision of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure that would permit Defendants-Respondents
to file a written supplement to either their oral argument
or their brief after the day of argument.l

If, however, the

Court is inclined to consider Defendants' "additional pages"
Plaintiffs submit the following to correct the erroneous conelusions contained therein.
Apparently Defendants, and possibly the Court, misconstrued the thrust of Plaintiffs' argument relating to attorney's
lRule 75(p) (3), U.R.C.P., authorizes corrections, but
not supplements.
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fees.

In this regard it is essential that the distinction be-

tween attorney's fees awarded as costs (§14-2-3) and attorney's
fees awarded as damages be kept in mind.

Plaintiffs readily

concede that both Defendants pleaded an entitlement to attorney's fees

("costs") under §14-2-3.

(Plaintiffs attached

copies of Defendants' counterclaims as an appendix to their
Supplemental Brief.)

Plaintiffs contend, however, that §14-2-3

does not authorize an award of attorney's fees on a Performance
Bond and thus Defendants would not be entitled to any award of
attorney's fees, either below or on appeal, based upon that
statute.

Further, Berg Brothers Construction (the partnership)

was not, as Defendants claim, the principal on that bond.

The

principal was Berg Construction Company (the joint venture).
Plaintiffs' second argument relates to Defendants' claim
that they are entitled to pass over to the Plaintiffs those attorney's fees awarded to the subcontractors.

As Plaintiffs

understand Defendants' contention they are seeking this pass
through not as costs under §14-2-3 but as damages for breach
of contract.
At oral argument Plaintiffs contended that the action of
the trial court awarding over the subcontractors' attorney's fees
was improper since Defendants failed to plead attorney's fees
as an element of their damages and provided no proof of this
matter

(as damages) at trial; further, the Court 2 made none of

2 Defendants erroneously contend in their "additional
pages" that plaintiffs asserted there were "no • • • findings
by Sponsored
Defendants-Respondents."
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the necessary findings that would sustain such an award as
damages

(see Plaintiffs' Supplemental Br;ef),
~
an d ,

·

~n

any event,

that it was the duty and province of the jury to award defendants
their damages for the contract breach and it made no award of
attorney's fees.
Defendants' argument that they pleaded an entitlement
to attorney's fees does not solve the rest of the deficiencies
relating to the award over; nevertheless, it has the potential
of creating a gross misunderstanding with this Court.
Even in its supplement, Surety does not contend that it
made any claim for attorney's fees other than on the Performance
Bond under §14-2-3.

Berg Brothers Construction (the partnership)

claims, however, that it did make such claims.

A review of the

record indicates that the purported "cross-claim" against the
owners relating to the Comstock-Murray Electric action was never
served on plaintiffs or their counsel; rather, it was mailed to
Ron Spratling, attorney for Murray-Comstock (R. D31); thus,
clearly there was no properly pleaded claim over that would
sustain the pass through of the $21,000 in attorney's fees awarded the electricians, even if the other shortcomings did not
exist.
With relation to the drywallers' claim Berg apparently
did file a claim over.
prior to trial

Plaintiffs moved to dismiss that claim

(R. C780-781).

That matter was argued July 16,

1976, and is reported in pages 25-36 of the Supplemental Transcript (blue backing).

Plaintiffs there argued that any kind of
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a pass through to them was improper because a bond had been
posted which met the requirements of §14-2-2.

Defendants

stated that the cross-claim was intended to deal only with the
matter of extras under the construction contract and was simply
filed so that any extras proved by the subcontractors against
Berg would be considered in the overall accounting in the contract action between the owners and the contractor.

In this

regard Mr. Nebeker stated:
Mr. Nebeker:

"But the cross-claim is simply to say
that the determination on how much drywall he
is entitled to and how much the electrician is entitled to goes into the overall
accounting • • • " (Supp T.32)

Thereafter the following dialogue took place:
The Court:

Mr.

Nebeker:

As I understand your response, Mr. Nebeker,
it isn't really you don't take issue with
what Mr. Tanner has said
"
"Sure • • • " (Supp T.33)

Based upon this representation by Defendants) the trial court
denied Plaintiffs' motion as follows:
The Court:

Anything further on that motion, gentlemen?
The Court is going to deny that motion with
the explanation given of course that what
their intention is and the Court I think
understands it's merely what they want to
do and I'll limit it to that at the time
of trial.

Mr. Tanner:

As I understand the Court's ruling, it is
based upon the proposition that no such
claim as I was talking about is in fact
being made therefor?

3Mr. Beesley concurred in the representations of Mr.
Nebeker (Supp T.34-35).
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The Court:

R~ght.
They don't from their explanation
glven me, they don't claim any other than
that entitled to under the contract.

Mr. Tanner:

Thank you. Just want to make that clear.
(Supp T.36)

The record shows that Defendants did not intend to pass
through attorney's fees awarded to the subcontractors.

If they

at one time so intended that position was clearly abandoned at
the pre-trial.
Defendants' contention that evidence regarding attorney's
fees was not presented to the jury is true.

This was because

Defendants were not pressing any claim to fees other than as
costs under §14-2-3.
absolutely clear.

Judge Hall's finding number 11 makes this

The only claim for attorney's fees advanced at

trial by Defendants or the subcontractors was under §14-2-3 which
does not contain any provision that would authorize a pass
through.
In reviewing the record in preparation of this response
one additional fact of interest was discovered.
On August 15, 1975, Comstock and Murray Electric filed
an Amended Verified Complaint wherein they alleged in Paragraphs
2-5 that a joint venture existed between Clifford M. Berg,
William R. Berg and Frank

c.

Berg and that the joint venture

was the general contractor on the Incline Terrace Project.

In

response thereto Surety, by answer of December 23, 1975, admitted
the allegations contained in Murray-Comstock's Paragraphs 2-5
and only took exception to the stated contract amount (R. C335);
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therefore, Surety's contention at trial and on appeal that there
was no joint venture should be precluded by its previous admission that the joint venture did in fact exist.
Respectfully submitted,
EARL D. TANNER & ASSOCIATES
Earl D. Tanner
J. Thomas Bowen
Attorneys for Plaintiffs,
Lignell and Todd
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